a collective bargaining agreement. 7 After the expiration of these periods, the presumption of majority support continues but becomes rebuttable. 8 During the time when the presumption of majority support may be rebutted, an employer may decide that the union no longer retains the support of a majority of its employees. The employer most likely would want to withdraw its recognition from the union and refuse to bargain.9 If subsequently charged with committing an unfair labor Court argued, promotes coherence in bargaining relationships, enhances the solemnity of the election process, gives the union time to carry out its mandate without pressure to produce hothouse results, encourages good-faith bargaining by the employer, and minimizes industrial strife. 9. An employer may also file a petition with the Board for a decertification election. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c)(l)(B) (1982) . However, an employer who seeks to withdraw recognition from a union would not find a decertification petition to be a realistic alternative. Such a petition will only be granted if an employer has reasonable, objective grounds for believing that the union no longer retains majority support. United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966) . Since the [Vol. 84:1770 practice, the employer may defend its action by rebutting the presumption of majority support in either of two ways. The employer can prove that when it withdrew recognition, the union did not, in fact, have majority support. Alternatively, the employer may present objective evidence 10 sufficient to establish the employer's reasonable goodfaith doubt as to the union's majority status at the time the employer refused to bargain. 11 The good-faith-doubt test has evolved into a standard "generally tantamount" to requiring proof "that the union did not in fact have majority support." 12 An employer may use a variety of evidence to justify its withdrawal of recognition including: a rapid decline in the number of union checkoffs, 13 union inactivity (in particular, failure to monitor contract provisions and to pursue grievances), 14 and employee expressions of dissatisfaction with the union. 15 Gypsum test for granting an employer a decertification petition is identical to the test an employer must meet to withdraw recognition, see notes 11-15 infra and accompanying text, an employer with sufficient proof of loss of majority support will withdraw recognition rather than talcing the less effective step of filing a decertification petition. Ray, supra note 7, at 914. Furthermore, the Board's "blocking charge" doctrine, which requires that the Board dismiss a union decertification petition whenever serious unfair labor practice charges are pending against the employer, ensures that a petition will rarely result in an actual election. faction is sufficient when no unfair labor practices exist). Other indicia ofloss of support include the filing of a representation petition by an outside union, employee turnover, and the union's margin of victory in the certification election. For a general discussion of the various types of objective evidence used by employers to prove union loss of support, see Ray, supra note 7, at 886-908; Seger, supra note 3 at 990-96.
Some employers attempt to establish their good-faith doubt by reference to polls of employees taken by the employer. 16 At present, the federal courts of appeals disagree with the National Labor Relations Board as to if and when an employer may legally poll its employees once a union has been certified.17 Since its 1974 Montgomery Ward decision, 18 the Board has only allowed employers to poll employees to determine whether the union deserves continued recognition (postcertification polling) if (1) the employer conducts the poll in accordance with the guidelines for polls conducted prior to a union's certification (precertification polling) established by the Board in Struksnes Construction Co., 19 and (2) the employer can sufficiently prove an objective basis for doubting the union's continued majority status. 20 The Board has held that the second prong of its postcertification test requires proof sufficient to satisfy the good-faith-doubt test for withdrawal of 16 (1974) .
17. Although the judgment of the federal courts may in some sense be considered superior to that of the Board because the courts may review, enforce, modify, or set aside the Board's decisions, 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) & (f), this disagreement nonetheless presents a serious conflict. The Board maintains that it is not bound to follow the law of the courts of appeals but rather must decide, in each case, whether it will acquiesce in the decisions of those courts or adhere to its previous holding until overruled by (1974) (poll by employer to determine union status is not proper when there is no valid basis for doubting the union's continuing majority). Although the decision was authored by an administrative law judge, the Board expressly adopted it as its own. Id. at 717. Therefore, this Note will consider this decision to be the Board's.
19. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1063 (1967): Absent unusual circumstances, the polling of employees by an employer will be violative of section S(a)(l) of the Act unless the following safeguards are observed: (1) the purpose of the poll is to determine the truth of a union's claim of majority, (2) this purpose is communicated to the employees, (3) assurances against reprisal are given, (4) the employees are polled by secret ballot, and (5) the employer has not engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere. [Vol. 84:1770 recognition. 21 Since an employer can only conduct a postcertification poll if it already can legitimately withdraw recognition, the Board's standard robs postcertification polling of its function as an indicator of a union's status. This result has caused one court of appeals to characterize the Board's test as tantamount to an outright ban on employer-sponsored polls in the incumbent union context. 22 Unlike the Board, the courts of appeals allow postcertification polling, conducted in a manner consistent with Struksnes, if the employer can show "substantial, objective evidence of a loss of union support, even if that evidence is insufficient in itself to justify withdrawal." 2 3 This Note evaluates these competing standards in light of the two major policy objectives of the NLRA: industrial stability 24 and employee free choice. 25 It concludes that the courts of appeals properly apply a less stringent standard. 26 Part I considers employer polling in the larger context of the general law of employer interrogation. This section concludes that the Board's standard for postcertification polling deviates significantly from the general law of employer interrogation as well as the more specific rules established for precertification polling. 24. Section 1 of the Act states: Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury, impairment or interruption, and pro· motes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial dis· putes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions and by re· storing equality of bargaining power between employers and employees. 26. In Montgomery Ward, the Board states two reasons for its decision. First, the employer did not establish sufficient objective evidence to satisfy the good-faith-doubt test. Second, the poll was conducted during a period when the Board would have been prohibited from conducting an election by its "contract bar" doctrine. 210 N.L.R.B. 717, 724 (1974) . This Note only argues that the objective evidence standard should be changed. It agrees that employer polls should be prohibited when the Board would not conduct an election because of its "certification year," "contract bar," "blocking charge,'' or similar doctrines. The union should also be protected from continued-recognition polling when a Board-conducted election is pending. See Struks11es, 165 N.L.R.B. at 1063. August 1986] distinctions between pre-and postcertification polling do not justify this deviation. Part II argues that allowing properly conducted employer polling enhances rather than harms employee free choice. Part III finds that the Act's policy of encouraging industrial stability also fails to support the Board's standard. Finally, Part IV concludes that even if employer polling disrupts existing bargaining relations to some extent, that disruption is consistent with the fundamental goals of the NLRA.
I. A DEPARTURE FROM THE LAW OF EMPLOYER

INTERROGATION
The Board has moved from rejecting all attempts by employers to question employees about their union activity (employer interrogation27) to applying a test which examines the totality of employer conduct. Originally, fearing intimidation and coercion of employees, the Board uniformly held that employer questioning of any kind was a per se violation of the Act. 28 Under this standard, the employee did not need to prove actual intimidation or coercion. 29 In 1954, prompted by the courts of appeals' rejection of this test, 30 the Board adopted an alternative, totality-of-conduct test for employer interrogation under 27. Employer interrogation means any attempt by the employer directly to question employees concerning any aspect of their union activity. However, "[t]he use of the word seems unfortunate and perhaps prejudicial. The term smacks of the inquisition and third degree; whereas, very often, the employer's questioning is quite innocent on its face, unaccompanied by the overt pressures and threats 'interrogation' seems to import." Recent Decisions, Labor Law -Unfair Labor Practice -Employer May Violate § 8(a}{J) in Attempting to Ascertain Union Majority Status, 41 NOTRE DAME LAW. 579, 580 n.11 (1966). Interrogation should not be confused with employer free speech, since it is neither the expression of any view or opinion, nor, if one accepts the premise that it is inherently coercive, protected by the first amendment. Id.
The Board argued:
Interrogation by an employer not only invades the employee's privacy and thus constitutes interference with his enjoyment of the rights guaranteed to him by the Act. Its effect on the questioned employee •.. is to "restrain" or to "coerce" the employee in the exercise of those rights. The employee . . . is reasonably led to believe that his employer not only wants information on the nature and extent of his union interests but also contemplates some form of reprisal once the information is obtained. . . . He fears that a refusal to answer or a truthful answer may cost him his job. He is also in effect warned that any contemplated union activity must also be abandoned, or he will risk loss of his job ... [Vol. 84:1770 the Act. 31 Today, that test remains the appropriate standard for determining whether employer interrogation constitutes an unfair labor practice. 32 Despite the flexibility of the Board's test for employer interrogation, the Board subjects postcertification polling to the practical equivalent of a per se prohibition. 33 This standard clashes with the totality-of-conduct test for interrogation. 34 That appears anomalous because the Board itself has recognized that a properly conducted secret ballot poll of an entire bargaining unit is inherently less coercive than the direct questioning of an individual employee. 35 Polling, or systematic interrogation, however, has long functioned under a more specific set of guidelines. This separate treatment began in 1965, when the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized the unsettled status of the law 36 and directed the Board to "outline at least minimal standards to govern the ascertainment of union status. " 37 In response, the Board established the standards for precertifi- The Board's guidelines for postcertification polling mark a significant departure from the specific standards developed for employer polling in the initial-recognition context. While the Struksnes test accepts the underlying philosophy of the totality-of-conduct test and structures the inquiry to increase certainty, the Board's Montgomery Ward rule regulating postcertification polling rejects that philosophy. Although these inconsistencies do not in themselves prove that the Board's postcertification guidelines are improper, such departures from the legal rules governing the law of employer interrogation should be reasonably justified. 40 The Board's past attempts to do so by reference to the goals of industrial stability and employee free choice have been inadequate.
II. EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
The Board's stringent rule for postcertification polling results primarily from the fear that employer polling undercuts a union's legitimate majority status and subverts employee free choice. 41 As the The purpose of the polling in these circumstances is clearly relevant to an issue raised by a union's claim for recognition and is therefore lawful. The requirement that the lawful purpose be communicated to the employees, along with assurances against reprisal, is designed to allay any fear of discrimination which might otherwise arise from the polling, and any tendency to interfere with employees' Section 7 rights. Secrecy of the ballot will give further assurance that reprisals cannot be taken against employees because the views of each individual will not be known. And the absence of employer unfair labor practices or other conduct creating a coercive atmosphere will serve as a further warranty to the employees that the poll does not have some unlawful object, contrary to the lawful purpose stated by the employer. . . .
[T]his rule is designed to effectuate the purposes of the Act by maintaining a reasonable balance between the protection of employee rights and legitimate interests of employers. 165 N.L.R.B. at 1063. The Board also held that polls taken while a petition for a Board election is pending would not serve any useful purpose and consequently would continue to be violative of § 8(a)(l 40. The standard supported by this Note requires that the employer have some objective evidence of a loss of union support before it can be allowed to conduct a postcertification poll. There is no similar requirement in the precertification context. This additional requirement serves two purposes. First, the increased concern for industrial stability in the postcertification context justifies the imposition of a threshold requirement for postcertification polling, even though it does not justify eliminating polling entirely. See Peoples Gas Sys. v. NLRB, 629 F.2d 35, 44 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Second, the legitimate concern over employer assertions of employee rights requires that the Board and the courts maintain an additional level of control over those assertions. The courts of appeals' standard requiring substantial evidence of loss of employee support before polling, prohibits an employer from repeatedly polling to undermine a union's strength. First, the Board's "contract bar" doctrine establishes a virtually irrebuttable presumption of majority support during the term of a collective bargaining agreement. 45 During this period an employer cannot use a union's lack of majority status as a defense to an unfair labor practice charge for a refusal to bargain. 46 Consequently, an employer could not have a good-faith reason for polling its employees during this period. It therefore would be prohibited from doing so under the Struksnes guidelines. 47 Since nearly ninety percent of the collective bargaining agreements have a life of at least two years, 48 the vast majority of employers would be prohibited from polling more than once every two years. 49 42. 165 N.L.R.B. 1062, 1062 (1967). The Board has also observed that an "employer cannot discriminate against union adherents without first determining who they are." Cannon Elcc. Second, even absent a collective bargaining agreement, polling would be prohibited for one year following the union's certification by the Board's "certification year" doctrine.so Finally, polling is costly and entails a considerable amount of employee time away from the job.st Many employers, particularly smaller ones,s 2 will be unwilling to face the costs of repeated polls unless their anti-union sentiment is very strong. s 3 In such cases the Board would be unable effectively to prohibit polling anyway.s 4
Most important, the Struksnes guideline that prohibits employer polling when the employer has "engaged in unfair labor practices or otherwise created a coercive atmosphere"ss allows the Board to handle coercive polls on a case-by-case basis. In Struksnes, the Board stated that this requirement would serve as a warranty to the employees that the poll does not serve some unlawful or coercive purpose. s 6 The guideline should protect the employees in the postcertification context as well. A case-by-case approach would both make the standard for postcertification polling more consistent with the general law of interrogation, s 7 and permit postcertification polling in those circumstances where it serves a legitimate purpose.
this constraint. Such a response is extremely unlikely given the disadvantages of short-term contracts, which include an increase in the time spent on negotiations, a rise in the number and costs of strikes, adverse effects upon employee morale, and an overall rise in labor costs. 
B. Employer Polling Enhances Employee Free Choice
Employee free choice includes not only the right to bargain collectively but also the right to refrain from bargaining collectively. 58 Thus, employee free choice is compromised when a majority of the employees no longer supports the union but is bound to the union by a decision made in years past. In such a situation, an employer's refusal to bargain actually implements the will of a majority of the employees. 59 Therefore, employer polling, to the extent that an employer effectuates its employees' sentiments, promotes rather than inhibits employee free choice. 60 Two arguments might be advanced against this claim. First, an employer might conduct its poll improperly. 61 If a poll did not accurately reflect employee sentiment, then employer actions based upon the results of that poll would be flawed. However, polls conforming to Struksnes guidelines generally provide valid results. The guidelines have consistently identified errors in employer-conducted polls. 62 Thus, questions about the validity of the results of employer polling do not justify a rule which essentially prohibits all postcertification polling.
More troublesome is the argument that because of the potential conflict between employers and employees over issues involving union representation, the courts as well as the Board need to be wary of employer attempts to assert employee rights. 63 Employers, however, are 58 . See note 3 supra. 59. Cf Comment, supra note 12, at 732 (withdrawal of recognition from a minority union enhances employee free choice). When deciding whether postcertification polling should be permitted, it seems improper to assume that the union retains majority support when that is exactly the question that a poll attemp~ to answer. 60. After stating that the primary criterion for its decision was employee free choice, the Sixth Circuit upheld an employer postcertification poll where the employer adhered to the Struksnes guidelines, and was prompted by objective evidence of loss of support even if that evidence was not sufficient in itself to justify a refusal to bargain. Thomas Indus., Inc. allowed to assert their employees' rights in some circumstances. 64 Employer postcertification polling should present another such situation because employees sometimes are unable adequately to assert their rights themselves. 6 5 An employee's remedy, if she thinks that the union no longer retains majority support, consists of filing a decertification petition. 66 If at least thirty percent of the employees in the bargaining unit sign the petition, the Board will conduct a decertification election to determine whether the union has majority support. 67 Filing a petition and gathering the requisite thirty percent interest requires employee organization and initiative, 68 as well as the knowledge that the procedure is available. 69 Employees may also abstain from filing decertification pe-NLRB, 578 F.2d 835, 840-41 (9th Cir. 1978) (" [T] he Board may strike the balance more favorable toward the union when the union's status is challenged by the employer rather than the employees themselves.").
64. One example is the employer decertification petition. See Ray, supra note 7, at 892-93. Another is an employer refusal to bargain. See notes 9-12 supra and accompanying text. pamphlets which refer to the decertification process and although an employee may obtain information by visiting or telephoning a NLRB office, "an employee must have the initiative to visit or telephone the Board in order to obtain these publications or to speak with a Board employee."
Id. Moreover, an employee cannot ask an employer for its help, since the employer commits an unfair labor practice if it gives more than "mere ministerial aid" to employees seeking to decertify the union. Consolidated Rebuilders, Inc., 171 N.L.R.B. 1415, 1417 (1968) . See generally Rosenthal, supra note 68, at 153-56 (discussing what is considered ministerial aid).
In addition, the Board's "contract bar" doctrine, explained in note 7 supra, exacerbates the knowledge gap. The existence of a collective bargaining agreement will prevent petitions from being filed except during a thirty-day period beginning three months prior to the end of the contract. Ray, supra note 7, at 919. Contracts are commonplace with incumbent unions. Thus, even if the employees know they have the right to file a petition they may not know when they may legally file. Professor Ray has suggested that the knowledge problem might be overcome by (Vol. 84:1770 titions to avoid incurring the union's disfavor. 70 Finally, the Board will also hold in abeyance any decertification petition where unfair labor practice charges have been filed that allege violations of the Act which interfere with the employees' free choice. These "blocking charges" 71 are often filed solely to impede or delay the processing of the decertification petition. 72 Employee free choice, therefore, is not sufficiently protected by the employee decertification petition procedure alone. 73 Although employer assertions of employee free-choice rights justify severe scrutiny, the potential conflict of interest between employer and employee does not justify a per se rejection of employer polling.
III. INDUSTRIAL STABILITY
The Board's second major objection to postcertification polling is that such polling will unduly disrupt industrial stability. 74 This concern does not justify prohibiting postcertification polling entirely. 75 requiring either the union or the NLRB to disseminate information about the petition process to the employees. Id. at 919-21. However, there is no guarantee that the methods suggested (e.g., posting notices on company bulletin boards) will adequately inform the employees. Moreover, this proposal ignores the problems of union animosity and circumvention, peer pressure, employee organization and employee initiative. Finally, Professor Ray's proposal may never actually be instituted.
70. The Board has upheld the expulsion of union members who "dared" to initiate decertification proceedings. Tawas Tube Prods., Inc., 151 N.L.R.B. 46 (1965 increasing ability to use the decertification procedure. Krupman & Rasin, supra note 69, at 232; Rosenthal, supra note 68, at 152-53 (factors contributing to the increasing number of decertification petitions include the movement to a service economy, disillusionment with unions as a result of stagflation at that time, and the increasing role of the government, rather than the union, as the protector of employee safety). What is clear is that decertification remains "a relatively difficult process, and existing procedures tend to thwart rather than facilitate decertification elections." Id. at 153.
74. The Board has argued that postcertification polling, like employer decertification petitions, should be allowed only when there are sufficient objective considerations to justify a refusal to bargain in order to "minimize the interruption and impairment of a bargaining relationship and the opportunity for a recalcitrant employer ... from keeping [sic] the bargaining relationship in a recurrent state of turbulence by periodically compelling the union to reestablish its majority .
•.
• "Montgomery Ward & Co., 210 N.L.R.B. 717, 724 (1974) ; cf. United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. 652 (1966) (establishing the standard for employer decertification petitions).
75. The Board also maintains that because employer decertification petitions are barred unless supported by objective considerations equivalent to that necessary to allow a withdrawal of
A. Permitting Polling Achieves Greater Industrial Stability
Protecting a union from postcertification polling may achieve the appearance of stability in the short run. However, in the long run, this practice actually disrupts effective bargaining. Before an employer may poll its employees, the union must have lapsed into ineffectiveness or otherwise demonstrated a loss of majority supporl'.7 6 A union whose support is seriously questioned by the employer will have little leverage at the bargaining table, little success in issuing a strike call, and generally less effectiveness than if the employees had no union at all. 77 Maintenance of existing bargaining relationships under these circumstances cannot promote industrial stability. Strikes may occur even if the union cannot be repudiated; indeed, the employees' inability to rid themselves of an unwanted union may actually precipitate a strike. 78 Moreover, since a union would be adequately protected from standard is violative of "established precedent as well as the language and fair intent of the National Labor Relations Act"), the standard for postcertification polling advanced by this Note does not allow an employer to usurp a Board function. First, postcertification polling is no more of a usurpation of a Board function than precertification polling is a usurpation of the Board's initial election certification function. Second, the Board's strict standard for employer decertification petitions results from the Board's concern that a less strict standard would allow employers to circumvent the good-faith-doubt test that it otherwise must meet to withdraw recognition. United States Gypsum Co., 157 N.L.R.B. at 656. While the employer decertification procedure is a substitute for a withdrawal of recognition, the continued-recognition poll functions as an index of loss of employee support to be used in determining the validity of such a withdrawal. Because the poll is not a substitute for the good-faith doubt, the Board's concern over usurpation · of its authority is misplaced.
76. The standard of the courts of appeals, supported by this Note, requires that before an employer may poll, it must have substantial objective evidence of the union's loss of majority support, even if that evidence is not enough to justify a withdrawal of recognition under the good-faith-doubt test. See note 23 supra and accompanying text. Board decisions illustrate that, in fact, employers generally have substantial doubt of continued majority support before they poll. E.g., Hutchinson-Hayes Intl., Inc., 264 N.L.R.B. 1300 (1982) (employer polls after union checkoffs decline from 86% to 40% of the employees in the the bargaining unit, there was significant employee turnover in the eight years since certification, union failed to renegotiate the contract (instead allowing automatic renewal), and employer learned of a decline in union membership and lack of attendance at union meetings); Thomas Indus., Inc., 255 N.L.R.B. 646 (1981) (poll conducted after supervisors received disparaging comments about the union from 42 out of 124 employees, checkoffs declined from 63% to 31 % in eight months, and 24 members of the union, including some officers, committeemen and stewards, resigned from the union), enforced in part and denied in part, 687 F.2d 863 (6th Cir. 1982).
77. Comment, supra note 12, at 738. [Vol. 84:1770 disruptive polling under the courts of appeals' standard, the Board's strict position is unnecessary.
The Board's practical prohibition of employer polling in the incumbent-union context further disrupts effective collective bargaining by exacerbating the uncertainty surrounding an employer's withdrawal of recognition. The present state of confusion as to the law concerning an employer's refusal to bargain 79 often leaves the employer unsure about its ability to articulate to the Board's satisfaction its reasons for doubting the union's continued majority. 80 An attempt to withdraw recognition may result in years of litigation, 81 depriving the employees of effective representation 82 and the employer of control over its business. 83 82. A recent article notes: If it is ultimately determined that the employer unlawfully withdrew recognition, it will generally be ordered to bargain with the union. However, this cannot restore to employees the years during which they have been denied their lawful right to a collective bargaining representative. Further, the years of non-recognition may have eroded the union's support within the unit .... Employees hired during the pendency of unfair labor practice proceedings will not have had the experience of being represented by the union and their support may not be as strong. Employees may also be frustrated by the union's apparent inability to do anything for them during the long hiatus. Ray, supra note 7, at 873 (footnotes omitted).
83. An "employer's duty to bargain in good faith requires that it bargain to impasse with the [union] before unilaterally changing any term or condition of employment." Ray, supra note 7, at 874. Consequently, the employer violates the law if it adjusts any benefit when the legality of the union's support is the subject of litigation that the union eventually wins. Since the usual remedy for a unilateral change of this nature includes restoration of withdrawn benefits, an employer is compelled by the potential expense to avoid making any changes, including substituting one benefit for another or adjusting pay to reflect economic difficulties. An employer, therefore, tification polling, an employer has no real alternative to test continued support short of a refusal to bargain. 84 Postcertification polling represents a quick and easy method to ascertain a union's status and to resolve employer doubt. 85 While surely not a panacea for the problem of uncertainty, employer polling can reduce its disruptive effects, thereby promoting the goal of industrial harmony.
B. Distinctions Between the Pre-and Postcertification Contexts
Similarities between the pre-and postcertification contexts demonstrate the utility of employer polling in both situations. Both require a speedy resolution of disputes concerning union status that might otherwise disrupt stable bargaining relationships. 86 Both involve a potential conflict of interest between the employer and its employees regarding union representation. Both require the resolution of the same underlying questions of majority status. Yet the Board's present guidelines result in "an anomaly: unions are given minimal protection at the inception of the bargaining relationships when they are the most is more restricted after a withdrawal of recognition than before. Furthermore, an unlawful withdrawal of recognition may convert an economic strike, in which an employer may hire replacement workers, into an unfair labor practice strike, in which it may not hire replacements, but rather must reinstate workers upon request. (1974) ("In terms of getting on with the problems of inaugurating regimes of industrial peace, the policy of encouraging secret elections under the Act is favored."); NLRB v. S.S. Logan Packing Co., 386 F.2d 562, 564-65 (4th Cir. 1967) ("There must be a secret ballot, so that each employee may express his true conviction free of any concern that employer, union or others to whom he may have made a commitment, or of whom he may feel in awe, will know his true feelings.").
Professor Ray argues that industrial peace can be promoted equally well in the incumbent union context through employer election petitions and postcertification polling. Indeed, postcertification polling could be administered more quickly and easily than the current system of withdrawal of recognition which is followed by the administrative red tape of the unfair labor practice proceedings. Ray, supra note 7, at 875 n.7, 916-17.
Professor Ray also argues, however, that employer polls are inadequate for determining union support for two reasons. Ray, supra note 7, at 908. He first argues that since the federal government is perceived as neutral, the results of Board-conducted elections are more reliable. The rule articulated in Struksnes, however, ensures the reliability of polls in the incumbent union context. See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text. More important, the alternative to an employer poll is not a Board-conducted poll, but rather a decision concerning whether or not to withdraw based upon less than reliable objective criteria. An employer poll is undoubtedly a more reliable gauge of employee sentiment than present techniques. See note 96 infra and accompanying text. Second, Professor Ray notes that official elections are conducted after notice to and debate among employees while employer polls are not. Although the significance of notice and debate remains unclear, one court has required that an employer give notice to a union before conducting a postcertification poll. NLRB v. A.W. Thompson 88 the Board explained its more stringent standard for postcertification polling by referring to the Act's concern for industrial stability, a concern that does not exist prior to a union's certification. 89 The Board first argued that although a union is properly called upon to show majority support in the initial recognition stage, an incumbent union is presumed to have a majority. 90 If the law gave employers an unrestricted license to search for proof of loss of majority, the argument goes, disruption of already existing bargaining relationships would result. This disruption would prevent the presumption of union support from advancing the Act's policy of allowing employees to bargain through representatives of their own choosing. 91 The existence of the presumption, however, cuts the other way. While the policies of the Act may justify placing the burden of disproving majority support on the employer, 92 these same policies do not require that the employer be denied the use of the tools necessary to meet that burden. The courts of appeals' standard does not give an employer an unrestricted license to poll its employees; an employer must have objective evidence of loss of majority support before it may poll. Furthermore, the employer usually will have less access than the union to information relevant to majority support. 93 Preventing the employer from obtaining evidence about employee sentiments through noncoercive means 94 merely shrouds the incumbent union in an impenetrable cloak of majority support and contravenes the same policy the Board is attempting to protect. 95 Finally, since a poll is a reliable indicator of majority support, 96 denying the employer the use of this tool may aggravate the confusion and uncertainty that plagues this area of the law. 97 Second, the Board argued that because a union must receive a fair chance to succeed after its election, it must be protected from postcertification polling. 98 A union worried about its status, the Board contends, will be distracted from long-term goals by the necessity of producing short-term results. However, the "certification year"99 and "contract bar" 100 doctrines already protect the union from any employer attack upon its employee support, including postcertification polling, for a substantial period of time 101 after the union has been recognized. But a union cannot be insulated from political pressures indefinitely. The political model of industrial democracy lies at the core of the national labor policy . 102 The union, like any other political representative, must be subject to periodic rejection or reaffirmation. 103 Since employer postcertification polling, conducted under the courts of appeals' guidelines, allows for such political testing in a manner that is orderly and noncoercive, industrial stability is not unduly compromised.
Finally, the Board attempted to distinguish the postcertification context by arguing that while an employer may often have a goodfaith reason for polling before the union has been certified, it will almost never have a good-faith motive after certification. 104 The Board's contention is incorrect. An employer may indeed have a good-faith desire to poll its employees in the postcertification context. An employer needs to determine correctly a union's status 105 to avoid committing an unfair labor practice by bargaining with a union that [Vol. 84:1770 lacks majority support 106 or by refusing to bargain with a union that is supported by the majority of the employees. 107 The Board itself recognized this in its Montgomery Ward decision when, one page before it argued that postcertification polling will always be in bad faith, it acknowledged that "the employer may also have a legitimate concern regarding the union's continuing majority status." 108 Moreover, the Board presumes that a desire to resolve the question of a union's status quickly indicates good faith. 109 Because an employer poll can determine whether a union has a majority faster than the current cumbersome procedure, 110 this presumption provides further support for the argument that an employer might conduct a postcertification poll in good faith. Thus, the Board's distinctions fail to justify the complete prohibition of employer polling in the incumbent union context.
IV. THE PROPER ACCOMMODATION BETWEEN INDUSTRIAL STABILITY AND EMPLOYEE FREE CHOICE
The Board's argument that postcertification polling disrupts industrial stability incorrectly equates the promotion of the goals of the NLRA with the maintenance of existing bargaining relationships. 111 The NLRA, however, establishes a more dynamic model of union representation than the Board attempts to implement. Congress intended to promote industrial stability through effective collective bargaining between the employer and an agent who maintains the support of a majority of the employees in a bargaining unit. 112 The balance be-tween industrial stability and employee free choice in the incumbency situation is problematic. Nevertheless, by prohibiting an employer either from recognizing a minority union or from refusing to recognize a union with majority support, 113 Congress has determined that the existence of majority status is the appropriate fulcrum. The Board's standard, by making it unduly difficult to oppose minority unions, 114 has inappropriately reweighed the two policies and established a balance inconsistent with congressional intent. Instead, the Board's rule should be modified to allow properly conducted postcertification polling under a standard that "ensures an accurate determination of actual majority status."115
CONCLUSION
An employer who is faced with a union's initial claim for recognition may legitimately poll its employees if it does so in accordance with the standards established by the Board in Struksnes. 116 Under the Board's present standard, the same employer cannot poll its employees once the union has been certified unless the employer has sufficient objective evidence of the union's loss of support to withdraw recognition, in addition to meeting the Struksnes standards. Because polling is valuable only as a tool to gather support for withdrawal of recognition, the employer that believes that a union no longer retains majority support will withdraw recognition rather than poll its employees. The Board's rule therefore is tantamount to an outright prohibition of polling in the postcertification context. The Board justifies this result by arguing that it is required by the underlying policies of employee free choice and industrial stability. A close consideration of these policies, however, shows that they are better promoted by allowing postcertification polling.
On the other hand, the federal courts of appeals allow postcertification polling consistent with Struksnes if an employer has objective evidence of the union's loss of support, even if that evidence is not on Education and Labor, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1931) (statement of Sen. Wagner). Both the policy of employee free choice and the policy of industrial stability are means to achieve the end of industrial peace and harmony. Comment, supra note 78, at 224. The Board's excessive concern with the preservation of existing bargaining relationships is also apparent in other contexts. See, e.g., Brooks, supra note 3, at 350·67 (the Board has pro· moted industrial stability at the expense of free choice in a number of contexts); Comment, supra note 12, at 719 (discussing the Board's application of the good-faith-doubt test, the author states: "[T]he Board has maximized industrial stability at the expense of free choice by placing an unduly heavy burden on the employer to prove that the incumbent union no longer commands the majority support of the employee unit.").
113. See notes 2-4 supra and accompanying text. 114. This conclusion gains support from the lack of § 8(a)(2) cases in the postcertification context. 115. Comment, supra note 12, at 740. 116. The standards are set forth in note 19 supra.
[Vol. 84:1770 sufficient to allow the employer to withdraw recognition. This is the better reasoned rule since it comprehends not only the similarity between the pre-and postcertification contexts, but also the legitimate place of polling in labor-management relations.
-James D. Dasso
